![]() ![]() By order entered April 5, 2013, Supreme Court - although addressing the merits of plaintiff's argument - "denied" the motion to reargue, prompting this appeal.Īs a general proposition, "no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue" (Gonzalez v L'Oreal USA, Inc., 92 AD3d 1158, 1160, lv dismissed 19 NY3d 874 ). Plaintiff then moved to reargue contending, among other things, that Supreme Court misapplied the standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). By order dated October 23, 2012, Supreme Court granted defendants' motion and denied plaintiff's cross motion. Defendants then brought a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and plaintiff cross-moved for a stay of the malpractice action pending resolution of the damages portion of his claim in the personal injury action. Love v State of New York, 78 NY2d 540, 544-545 see generally Rice v Valentine, 75 AD3d 631, 631 ). Plaintiff thereafter commenced this malpractice action against defendants contending that their delay in moving for summary judgment deprived him of the statutory interest theoretically due on his prospective judgment (see CPLR 5002, 5004 cf. Appellate counsel's efforts were successful - with the Second Department reversing the underlying order and granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability (Rodriguez v Ryder Truck, Inc., 91 AD3d 935 ). When that motion was denied, plaintiff discharged defendants and retained new counsel to In December 2009, defendants - in the context of the personal injury action - moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. ![]() Following joinder of issue in the underlying action, plaintiff discharged his initial counsel and, in September 2003, retained defendants to represent his interests therein. This legal malpractice claim has its origins in a personal injury action brought by plaintiff against the owner and operator of the truck that rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle in October 2002 while it was stopped at a traffic light. Shuttleworth III of counsel), for respondents.Īppeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered Apin Columbia County, which, upon reconsideration, among other things, adhered to its prior decision granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Chakwin Jr., New York City, for appellant.įinkelstein & Partners, Newburgh (James W. JACOBY & MEYERS, LLP, et al., Respondents.īefore: McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Clark, JJ. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. ![]()
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